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Abstract
We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordi-
nation in team or partnership structures. For this purpose, we view
individuals jointly engaging in productive processes—a ‘team’—as en-
dowed with individual and privately held information on the joint pro-
duction process. Once individual information is shared, team members
decide individually on the effort they exert in the joint production pro-
cess. This effort, however, is not contractible; only the joint output (or
profit) of the team can be observed. Our central question is whether
or not incentives can be provided to a team in this environment such
that team members communicate their private information and exert
efficient productive efforts on the basis of this communication. Our
main result shows that there exists a simple ranking-based contract
which implements both desiderata in a wide set of situations.
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“Forming a business partnership is the next best thing to getting
married.” The Manufacturing Jeweler, March 1897
1 Introduction
Consider a patient who, following an accident, needs the urgent and intensive
attention of a team of several experts (e.g., anesthetist, orthopedist, nurses
etc). An initial diagnosis yields private information to each expert which
needs to be pooled before surgery. During surgery itself, the individual, spe-
cialized expert efforts are not necessarily observe- or verifiable, especially
when situations are considered where expertise does not overlap or proce-
dures need to be performed in isolation. Hence, individual incentives may
exist to provide sub-optimal efforts, in particular if coordinated with an ini-
tially misstated individual opinion on the patient’s medical needs.1 The joint
outcome produced is the health status of the patient which is rewarded by
(insurance company) payments which are shared among the team members.
Our paper derives a rule for sharing this reward among team members in
a way that ensures both truthful information exchange and the exertion of
efficient unobservable efforts.
As another application, consider the global hedge fund industry which
currently manages assets worth in excess of $2.63 trillion (Hedge Fund Re-
search, 2014). Despite this staggering amount, the economics literature has
to date paid little attention to the incentives which motivate the individu-
1 Popular press accounts of recent medical scandals exhibiting a mixed moral hazard
and adverse selection flavor include Abelson & Creswell (2012) who document the
systematic use of unnecessary procedures at HCA, the largest for-profit hospital chain in
the United States. Armstrong et al. (2014) discuss regularly scheduled ‘emergencies-by-
appointment’ in which patients were given appointments for emergency room treatment
at New York Mount Sinai Hospital’s catheterization lab. “The cath lab extols its
volume; the most recent annual report described the growth in its number of procedures
as ‘remarkable,’ ‘substantial,’ ‘significant’ and ‘tremendous.’ Hospital records show
that the lab’s compensation system for doctors incentivizes more procedures.” Mehtsun
et al. (2013) identify 9,744 US surgical ‘never events’—serious, largely preventable
professional mistakes which should never happen—between 1990 and 2010 resulting in
malpractice payments of $1.3 billion.
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als who operate these funds.2 We close this gap by developing a framework
which represents the strategic environment in which fund managers or, more
generally, teams of privately informed partners, do their work.
The organizational structure of partnerships (or, synonymously through-
out the paper, teams) seems to fit the needs of the asset management industry
well. Most hedge funds and investment firms in this industry are privately
run as general/limited partnerships. ‘Investment clubs’ are partnerships in
which a small number of members pool their resources to make joint invest-
ments. Other examples of investment partnerships, often without limited
liability, include ‘single family offices,’ i.e., private companies that manage
investments and trusts for a single, usually very wealthy, family. The main
reason why the partnership structure is attractive in the mentioned cases is
that the partners have ‘skin in the game.’ Hence, regulatory oversight is usu-
ally minimal because the few heavy-weight partners involved are generally
trusted to exert due care in their investment decisions.3
The principal elements of our model are private information, unobservable
efforts and team structure.4 As organizations can be seen to exist precisely
in order to resolve or process informational problems (Coase, 1937), the in-
troduction of asymmetric information into what is otherwise a classical team
production problem seems to be natural. To fix ideas, consider a situation
in which one of the team members receives a private signal.5 Our main re-
sult shows that a team remuneration scheme based on a ranking of partners’
2 The incentives given to these individuals are not trivial: according to Vardi (2013), the
top 40 hedge fund managers and traders earned a combined $16.7 billion in 2012.
3 The same partnership structure as inherent in our examples from the financial industry
is also the predominant form of organizational governance in many other industries
including accounting, law, architecture and others (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). We
provide a discussion of further applications and examples in the concluding section of
this paper.
4 In team or partnership structures, partners share the profit among themselves. Thus,
any incentive mechanism is subject to the constraint to balance the team’s budget.
Note that many other bilateral or multilateral contractual situations are also subject
to the same (implicit) budget restriction (Spulber, 2009, p57, p97).
5 In our basic model, we only consider a single team member with private information.
We generalize this environment later, as part of our extensions, to an arbitrary number
of privately informed team members. In terms of our motivating stories, the single
informed ‘leader’ may be a medical specialist with a team of uninformed nurses or a
hedge fund manager who obtains private information on market conditions.
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efforts exists which can overcome this ‘communications dilemma’ and im-
plement both efficient information sharing and subsequent efficient efforts.
Hence, our mechanism indicates how partner incentives can be structured in
order to avoid perverse incentives.
The paper’s findings can be summarized as follows. Our main result shows
that a profit sharing rule exists which subdivides realized team output un-
evenly among all team members in symmetric equilibrium. This rule ensures
the communication of relevant private information by one team member—
whom we call the ‘team leader’—and subsequent efficient effort exertion by
all team members (including the leader) although efforts are not assumed
to be contractible. Moreover, the proposed profit sharing rule allocates the
entire realized output among the team members and thus balances its budget
in and out of equilibrium. The derived sharing rule depends on some statistic
of exerted efforts on which team remuneration can be based, for instance, the
precision of a contractible ranking of partners’ efforts interpreted as a contest
among team members.6 This result is derived for a general environment only
restricted by concave output (as a function of the sum of efforts) and convex
effort costs.
The main element that our analysis adds to the literature and which al-
lows for a positive solution to the combined problem of Holmstro¨m (1982)
and Hermalin (1998) is the noisy ranking of team members’ efforts which is
the main novelty in the sharing rule that we describe above. This relative per-
formance information seems to be regularly collected and naturally available
as part of incentive schemes in many organizations (Lazear & Shaw, 2007).
Moreover, since the required effort information is ordinal rather than cardi-
nal, collecting these statistics represents a weaker informational requirement
than embodied in standard piece-rate based contracts.
Given the classic results of Holmstro¨m (1982) for moral hazard in teams
and Hermalin (1998) for the adverse selection leadership case, our positive
result may be surprising because, in the combined problem, the profit shar-
6 With respect to our first example involving medical experts, recent evaluations of (rel-
ative) performance pay in the medical professions include Ogunyemi et al. (2009),
Bardach et al. (2013) and Himmelstein & Woolhandler (2014). Bonus payments based
on competitions are also widespread in the financial services industries.
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ing rule needs to address complex, twofold incentives. First, the privately
informed leader is able to misrepresent her private information about joint
productivity in order to deceive the other team members into providing in-
efficiently high (or low) efforts while planning to capitalize on this response
through a low (or high) effort herself. The second incentive problem that the
sharing rule must address is that, because of uncontractible efforts, the other
team members may be tempted to ‘free ride’ by exerting inefficiently low
efforts even though the leader provided correct information. Intuitively, the
presented sharing rule can dissuade the leader from this behavior by making
sure that, even for misrepresented private information, efficient effort provi-
sion given that report remains a best response for both the leader and the
other team members. Since our profit sharing rule is explicitly constructed to
guarantee this, a pair of misleading report and subsequent inefficient effort
is not profitable. Consequently, as the leader has incentives to report her
information truthfully, the other team members may base their response on
this report which allows for a jointly efficient set of efforts. Our sharing rule
is able to overcome this second problem through incorporating an appropri-
ately structured contest among all team members which ensures that free
riding incentives are counterbalanced with individual winning probabilities
based on some statistic of players’ efforts.
We subsequently are able to generalize this main result in three direc-
tions: i) for the case where the leader receives only a ‘noisy signal’ of the
true productivity parameter, ii) the case of ‘information pooling’ in which
any number of team members need to contribute their private information in
order to make efficient production possible, and iii) the case of ‘leading by ex-
ample’ in which the leader can exert either contractible or non-contractible
upfront efforts. In all three extensions the precise formulation of the re-
quired sharing rule changes but our principal result, that full efficiency is
implementable, is robust to these model variations.
In summary we present a general solution to the communication and
coordination problem couched in a classic joint production problem among
symmetric team members. We interpret our result as underpinning the emer-
gence of a profit sharing rule as a function of private information which is, in
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our model, a required factor of the joint production process. If information or
knowledge is dispersed, our model implements efficient cooperation between
team members who voluntarily share their private information. This cap-
tures the process in which a team or partnership can integrate the specialist
knowledge of its members as a precondition for subsequently overcoming the
free rider problem.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is to first provide a short overview
of the two main literatures unified by this paper followed by the model def-
inition and the characterization of efficient efforts in section 2. Section 3
then presents our main result: the derivation of a general profit sharing rule
which ensures the communication of private information through a single
team leader and subsequent efficient effort provision by all team members.
Section 4 proceeds to illustrate several extensions of the main model, i.e.,
full characterizations of the efficiency inducing sharing rule i) in the pres-
ence of stochastic signals, ii) when information is dispersed among multiple
team members (not just the leader), and iii) for the case of ‘leading by ex-
ample’ in which the leader exerts upfront observable efforts. Finally, this
section discusses the conditions under which our sharing rule satisfies lim-
ited liability. In the concluding section, we offer a discussion of a further
set of applications and examples centering on the ideas of leadership and
coordination. The proofs of the main results can be found in appendix A.
A proof ensuring the existence of the equilibrium we derive under a broad
class of specifications can be found in appendix B, together with an example
illustrating equilibrium existence in further cases.
Related Literature
The present paper combines the two distinct literatures on information-based
leadership and moral hazard in teams into a unified contracting framework.
Although questions and problems of leadership arise in many situations, re-
markably few economic studies exist of the concept itself. The relevant lead-
ership literature consists mainly of Hermalin (1998), Komai et al. (2007),
Komai & Stegeman (2010), and Zhou (2011). The emphasis is here on a
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privately informed player who is communicating her information to others
and participates in team production.7 Hermalin (1998) is the first paper to
study information-based leadership; he defines a leader as a team member
who induces voluntary following by credibly transmitting private informa-
tion. Through an observable sacrifice, an informed player can convince her
partners to exert higher subsequent efforts than without. Similarly, if the
leader’s upfront investment is tangible, then ‘leading by example’ can miti-
gate the adverse selection problem. However, by using a fixed sharing rule
of team output among the players, Hermalin (1998) solely concentrates on
information revelation, he does not consider the free-riding problem. Komai
et al. (2007) study partially revealing announcements by a leader and show
that, in some circumstances, it is better to concentrate information with
a single player rather than making it transparent among all players, thus
providing a justification for the existence of information-based leadership.
Komai & Stegeman (2010) broaden the study of leading-by-example games
to binary participation choice and nonlinear utility functions. Zhou (2011)
extends this information-based leadership framework to the study of organi-
zational hierarchies. Recent and comprehensive surveys are Ahlquist & Levi
(2011) and Hermalin (2012). Contrasting with this literature, we develop a
ranking-based compensation scheme in which the prize structure depends on
the level of team output and the leader’s announcement of the state of the
world. This mechanism encourages the leader to truthfully reveal her private
information while at the same time eliminating the free-riding incentive of
all team members.
A related and structurally similar setup is used in the classical literature
on moral hazard in teams as discussed, for instance, in Alchian & Demsetz
(1972) and Holmstro¨m (1982). Most of this literature focuses solely on mit-
igating the free-riding incentives under the constraints of budget balance.
7 Other theoretical models on leadership typically adopt a principal-manager-agent ap-
proach in which the manager takes aspects of the role of leaders in our model. See,
for example, Rotemberg & Saloner (1993), Blanes i Vidal & Mo¨ller (2007), and Bolton
et al. (2012). There, the manager’s major function is to choose a mission/project
and coordinate the subordinates. In our setting, if the leader does not participate in
production, a lump sum payment to the leader and a tournament for the other team
members as in Gershkov et al. (2009) implements efficiency.
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Examples include Legros & Matthews (1993), Battaglini (2006), Kvaløy &
Olsen (2006), and Bonatti & Ho¨rner (2011).8 We extend the pure moral
hazard problem studied by Gershkov et al. (2009) by introducing incomplete
information. Their contract is based on a partial but verifiable ranking of
agents’ efforts and implements efficiency. This literature is distinct from the
Principal-Agent framework because of the absence of a principal in our model
and the implied requirement for the budget to balance.
There has been intensive interest in combined adverse selection and moral
hazard problems. See Guesnerie et al. (1989) for a comprehensive review of
the early literature. In a repeated setting, Rahman (2012) characterizes an
optimal contract if the monitor’s observations are private and costly. Ger-
shkov & Perry (2012) characterize optimal contracts in a dynamic principal-
agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as
repeated).
2 The model
There is a set N of n ≥ 2 symmetric, risk-neutral players. Each player i ∈ N
exerts efforts ei ∈ [0,∞) which need not, in principle, be verifiable. Effort
costs c(ei) are assumed to be strictly convex with c(0) = 0 and c
′(0) = 0.
Efforts generate increasing and concave team output of y(α, e1 + · · · + en)
which depends on the sum of players’ efforts and the realization of some
random variable α ∼ H[a,b], with 0 < a < b ≤ ∞ and y (·, ·) is twice con-
tinuously differentiable with y2(α, 0) > 0 for any α ∈ [a, b].9 We assume
moreover that the team output or production function y(α, e1 + · · ·+ en) is
8 Using a mechanism design approach, Blanes i Vidal & Mo¨ller (2013) study the trade-
off between two privately informed partners’ selection of a joint project (‘adaption’)
and the impact of communicating this private information on subsequent team efforts
(‘motivation’). They find that first best cannot be implemented whenever the relative
payoff influence of adaption is low compared to that of motivating the colleague.
9 Throughout the paper, hi, h ∈ {y, f, s}, denotes the partial derivative of h with respect
to the ith argument. The second derivative with respect to the same ith argument is
denoted hi,i and the second order mixed partial derivative with respect to the i
th and
jth arguments is written hi,j . As usual, h
′ denotes the first derivative of a function
with a single argument.
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supermodular, that is, exhibits positive cross derivatives between ei and α.
Assume that the signal α is privately observed by player 1, the team leader,
while all other team members only know the distribution of α. Throughout,
we denote the observed signal by α∗ and the reported signal by α′. We call
the actual realization of output y∗.
We assume that, in addition to the information about the generated out-
put, there is a tournament that specifies a ranking of the agents according
to their exerted efforts. We assume that the ranking is noisy and depends
only on the agents’ exerted efforts. The outcome of the tournament is ob-
servable and verifiable. We employ the following notation: fJ (ei, e−i) is the
probability that player i is ranked jth. We assume that these functions f are
symmetric with respect to the identity of the players. Because probabilities
are additive we have, for any i ∈ N , ei and e−i,
(1)
n∑
J =1
fJ (ei, e−i) = 1.
In addition to differentiability of f(ei, e−i) with respect to all arguments we
assume that, for any e−i, f
1 (ei, e−i) increases with ei, that is, the probability
to be ranked first increases with own effort. A team contract specifies the
shares of team output of each player. Budget balancing requires that these
shares sum to one across players.
2.1 Efficiency benchmark
We start by defining the socially efficient level of team efforts. Efficient efforts
are defined as the set of efforts which maximize social welfare as chosen by
a benevolent planner (who knows α∗ and can dictate agents’ efforts)
(2)max
e
y(α∗, e1 + · · ·+ en)−
n∑
i =1
c(ei).
Hence, symmetric first-best efforts e∗(α∗) = e∗1(α
∗) = · · · = e∗n(α∗) are de-
fined through
(3)y2(α
∗, ne(α∗)) = c′(e(α∗)).
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Note that supermodularity of the output function implies that e∗(α∗) is in-
creasing. Therefore, the tournament does not play any role in the efficient
outcome, but can be used as an information device for implementing the
efficient effort choice.
2.2 Dual incentive problem
In our setup, the leader has private information on the value of the group’s
productivity parameter α∗. Although this information is valuable to every-
one, a problem arises if the players share team output in some fixed way be-
cause the leader may have an incentive to lie: Intuitively, the leader may find
it individually beneficial to claim that the group is in a ‘high-productivity’
state through some report α′ > α∗ to induce all the other team members
to exert high efforts, even if she plans to put in less. The other team mem-
bers, anticipating this, may then disregard the leader’s report. Thus, in this
framework, an efficient team contract, while keeping the budget balanced,
has to solve a double incentive problem: i) eliciting true information from
the leader and ii) encouraging efficient effort from both the leader and the
other team members.
3 Results
In this section we present the incentive mechanism and our results for the
case where information is isolated in the sense that only the team leader,
called player 1, has private information. This setup is later generalized to
dispersed information where each player receives a private signal on team
productivity.
The designer suggests the following mechanism consisting of a ranking-
based sharing rule which divides the total generated output y∗ and a dynamic
structure. At the first stage, after the leader learns her private information
and all players observe the proposed sharing rule, they either accept or dis-
agree to participate in the mechanism. If the contract is rejected by at least
one agent, the game ends. Conditional on acceptance of all agents, the pri-
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vately informed player reports her information publicly. At the second stage,
all players exert efforts and, after the realization of both output and the
ranking of the tournament, the generated team output is shared according
to the proposed sharing rule.10
This sharing rule depends on the report of the team leader α′ and the
realized output y∗. We denote by sl(y∗, α′) the share of the agent who was
ranked lth according to the tournament, when the realized output is y∗ and
the report of the leader is α′.11 Budget balancedness implies that, for any y∗
and α′,
(4)
n∑
l =1
sl(y∗, α′) = 1.
We now show that, for the leader, reporting α′ = α∗ is part of a (Per-
fect) Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy of the game defined by the above
mechanism and that, subsequently, exerting the efficient effort choices e∗(α∗)
constitutes a Nash equilibrium for all players. The expected utility of player
i ∈ N from choosing effort level ei after observing report α′ in the true state
of the world α∗ while the other players choose their equilibrium effort given
the reported state, e∗(α′), is ui(ei, e
∗
−i(α
′), α∗) =
(5)Eα∗
[
y(α∗, σ(ei, e
∗
−i(α
′)))
(
n∑
l=1
f l(ei, e
∗
−i(α
′))sl(y∗, α′)
)∣∣∣∣α′
]
− c(ei)
in which (s1 (·, ·) , . . . , sn (·, ·)) is the output- and report-dependent sharing
rule. Competitors’ report-dependent efforts are
e∗−i(α
′) = (e∗(α′), ..., e∗(α′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
),
output depends on σ(ei, e
∗
−i(α
′)) = ei + (n − 1)e∗(α′) and expectations are
over α∗ conditional on the reported α′.
10 This is not the only mechanism that implements efficient efforts. In particular, the
direct mechanism, in which the team leader reports her signal privately to the designer
and the designer sends effort recommendations to all agents using a similar sharing
rule, implements efficiency as well.
11 Since besides the private information of player 1, all agents are homogenous we show
that a symmetric sharing rule can implement efficient efforts. In case of heterogenous
agents, identity dependent sharing rules should be used. This is also true for the case
in which the leader should be remunerated on the basis of a different sharing rule than
the uninformed team members.
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Our first result states that ex post efficient efforts by all players, e∗(α∗),
can always be obtained as an equilibrium of our game.
Proposition 1. Efficient, symmetric efforts for all players defined in (3)
can be implemented through the winner’s share s1(y∗, α′) =
(6 )
1
n
+
n− 1
ny∗f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−i(α
′))
[
c′(e∗(α′))− y2(α
∗(y∗, α′), ne∗(α′)))
n
]
in which α∗(y∗, α′) is the solution to y∗ = y(α∗, ne∗(α′)) and the losers’ share
sj(y∗, α′) = 1−s
1(y∗,α′)
n−1
for all j 6= 1.
All main proofs can be found in appendix A. We postpone the discussion
of equilibrium existence to appendix B.
The idea of the proof of proposition 1 is to construct a sharing rule which
encourages the team leader to exert the efficient effort level e∗(α′) given
her own report α′ even if the report does not correspond to the true state
of the world α′ 6= α∗. This sharing rule, in addition to solving the moral
hazard problem between all agents, provides the correct incentives for the
team leader to report the correct state of the world at the first stage.
The interpretation of how the mechanism works is as follows. Focus first
on the second stage of the game, i.e., after some signal α′ has been revealed
by player 1 at the first stage. Individual efforts have two effects: first, they
enlarge the total output available for all players to share. Since the costs
of these efforts are born individually, however, there is the usual free-riding
incentive in teams. The contest designed around the appropriately chosen
reward system (6) introduces, however, a second effect in which increasing
the own effort increases also the chance of winning while simultaneously
decreasing the other players’ chances. By trading off the first against the
second effect, the mechanism can provide players with incentives to exert
report-contingent efficient efforts e∗(α′).12
Given equilibrium behavior at stage two, the designed mechanism en-
sures that the privately informed player 1 finds it disadvantageous to choose
12 This tradeoff has been previously reported by Gershkov et al. (2009) in a game of
complete information.
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a pair consisting of a misreport α′ at stage one and an inefficient, signal-
contingent effort choice at the second stage of the game. A pair consisting
of a low misreport (enticing low efforts e∗(α′) of the uninformed players in
equilibrium), together with higher than efficient effort is undesirable under
the reward structure (6) because individual, convex effort cost is too high
relative to the appropriately chosen winner’s share of (lower) total output.
Similarly, a high misreport (enticing high efforts e∗(α′) of the uninformed
players in equilibrium) together with low own efforts (and costs) to win a
larger prize is discouraged because a well designed losing prize decreases in
realized output. Since, therefore, the informed player 1 has appropriate in-
centives to truthfully report her signal, the uninformed team members can
rely on a truthful report in equilibrium and exert efficient efforts.
Remark 1. We can separate the effects of moral hazard and adverse selection
on our sharing rule. Recall that in Gershkov et al. (2009), for the case of
commonly known state of the world α∗, the report-independent winner’s share
that implements efficiency is
(7 )s1(y∗, α∗) =
1
n
+
(n− 1)2y2(α∗, ne∗(α∗))
n2f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))y(α∗, ne∗(α∗))
with each of the losers receiving sj(y∗, α∗) = 1−s
1(y∗,α∗)
n−1
.
Remember, that our new sharing rule (6) provides efficient incentives to
the uninformed agents when they believe that the informed agent reported the
right state of the world. Inserting α′ = α∗ into sharing rule (6) and recalling
that efficiency implies both y2(α
∗, ne∗(α∗)) = c′(e∗(α∗)) and α∗(y∗, α∗) = α∗,
we get s1(y∗, α∗) =
(8 )
1
n
+
n− 1
n
[
c′(e∗(α∗))
f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))y(α∗, ne∗(α∗))
− y2(α
∗(y∗, α∗), ne∗(α∗))
f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))y(α∗, ne∗(α∗))n
]
=
1
n
+
n− 1
ny(α∗, ne∗(α∗))
[
y2(α
∗, ne∗(α∗))
f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))
− y2(α
∗, ne∗(α∗))
f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))n
]
.
which delivers (7) immediately. Therefore, the shares of the uninformed
agents along the equilibrium path are the same as in Gershkov et al. (2009).
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Hence, the ‘correction’ of the sharing rule to take care of adverse selection
can be expressed as
(9 )
n− 1
n
[
c′(e∗(α′))
y∗f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−i(α
′))
− y2(α
∗(y∗, α′), ne∗(α′))
ny∗f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−i(α
′))
− (n− 1)y2(α
∗, ne∗(α∗))
nf 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))y(α∗, ne∗(α∗))
]
which we interpret as the (off-equilibrium) value of information to the win-
ner.13 This correction makes the shares report-dependent.
Notice that the loser’s share 1−s
1(y∗,α′)
n−1
is given by
(10)
1
n
− 1
ny∗f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−i(α
′))
[
c′(e∗(α′))− y2(α
∗(y∗, α′), ne∗(α′)))
n
]
.
Therefore, the difference between the winner’s and the loser’s compensations
is given by
(11)
[
c′(e∗(α′))− y2(α
∗(y∗, α′), ne∗(α′)))
n
]
1
f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−i(α
′))
where the expression in the square brackets is the private marginal disutility
from the effort exertion. This element aligns incentives of the agents with
the socially efficient objective which, in turn, generates the correct incentives
for the agents to report information and to exert socially efficient efforts.
From (6), we get an immediate comparative statics result with respect to
the precision of the success function f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−i(α
′)).
Corollary 1. The share of the winner s1(y∗, α′) decreases on the equilibrium
path with the precision of the ranking f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−i(α
′)).
This is intuitive (and proved formally in the appendix), since high ranking
precision increases the incentives for the agents. Therefore, if f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−i(α
′))
increases, agents want to exert higher efforts. To restore their incentives, the
share of the winner should be adjusted/decreased.
13 This is different from the notion of value of information in Hermalin (1998, footnote 12)
who shows that second best team welfare under the true signal exceeds team welfare
under the expected signal. (The same would be true in our model.)
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Example 1: We illustrate our efficiency result from proposition 1 in a simple
example with n players, Tullock ranking technology f 1(ei, e−i) =
eri∑
j e
r
j
,14
linear production y(α∗,
∑
i ei) = α
∗
∑
i ei, and quadratic effort cost e
2
i /2.
Note that in this example, the efficient effort level e∗(α∗) = α∗. This is
implemented through the following ranking-based sharing rule:
s1(y∗, α′) =
1
n
− n− 1
n3f 11 (α
′, α′)α′
+
(n− 1)α′
ny∗f 11 (α
′, α′)
=
1
n
− 1
nr
+
nα′2
y∗r
,
sj 6=1(y∗, α′) =
1
n
+
1
n3f 11 (α
′, α′)α′
− α
′
ny∗f 11 (α
′, α′)
=
1
n
+
1
n(n− 1)r −
nα′2
(n− 1)y∗r
in which s1(·) of the final team output is awarded to the first-ranked player
while sj 6=1(·) is awarded to all other players. In this example, limited liability—
defined as non-negative shares of output for all players—is satisfied on the
equilibrium path if r ≥ 1.⊳
Remark 2. An advantage of the contest approach is that it requires only
ordinal information on agents’ efforts which is arguably easier to collect than
information on the precise effort realizations. Nevertheless, the fact that we
are able to implement efficient efforts implies that a noisy ordinal ranking of
efforts is a sufficient statistic in the sense of Holmstro¨m (1982, Section 3)
for the cardinal effort information employed in standard contracts.
Remark 3. Assume for the moment that it is commonly known that the
leader reports truthfully. Then we know from Holmstro¨m (1982) that there
exists no sharing rule that simultaneously ensures efficient efforts and bal-
ances its budget. Hence, without the additional information on the noisy
ranking incorporated in our contest we cannot obtain efficient effort exer-
tion. In other words, if a sharing rule cannot condition on effort information
(including some noisy ranking of efforts), it cannot induce both truthful re-
porting and efficient effort exertion. Similarly, Gershkov et al. (2009) show
that a sharing rule which takes into account ranking information but does not
vary with output cannot generally implement efficiency.
14 For completeness, we define f1(0, . . . , 0) = 1/n; the implied discontinuity at point
(0, . . . , 0) plays no role in this example.
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4 Extensions and robustness
4.1 Noisy signals
In this section we illustrate that perfect information of the team leader is
not crucial for efficient incentive provision. That is, one may fear that the
positive result of proposition 1 follows from the fact that given the observed
output y∗ and knowing the equilibrium effort e∗(α′), the designer may learn
the exact private information of the team leader and ‘punish’ her in case of
misreporting. Here we show that it is not the case. We consider an output
or production function of the form y (α∗; ε; e) = y (α∗ + ε,
∑n
i=1 ei) where
ε ∼ G [ε, ε¯] with E (ε) = 0 and density g. That is, we assume that the team
leader observes the production parameter with some noise. Moreover, we
assume that the uncertainty is realized only after the effort exertion. The ex
post efficient efforts then solve
(12)max
e1,...,en
Eε
[
y
(
α∗ + ε,
n∑
i=1
ei
)]
−
(
n∑
i=1
c(ei)
)
.
Given our assumptions on the production function, the ex post efficient effort
level, e∗ (α∗) is given by
(13)
∫ ε¯
ε
y2 (α
∗ + ε, ne∗ (α∗)) g(ε)dε = c′ (e∗ (α∗)) .
The dynamic game structure in the case of a noisy signal is similar to the
deterministic case: Player 1 reports α′ and, at the second stage and given
this report, all players simultaneously choose efforts. We would like to find
a sharing rule assigning output shares to the first-, second-, third-ranked
players etc.
(14)
(
s1 (y∗, α′) ,
1− s1 (y∗, α′)
n− 1 , . . . ,
1− s1 (y∗, α′)
n− 1
)
such that, for any observed α∗ and reported α′, player 1 will choose the report-
contingent efficient effort e1 = e
∗(α′) and it is a best response for every other
player to also choose the report-contingent efficient efforts e∗(α′).
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The expected utility of player 1 if she observes α∗, reports α′ and exerts
effort e1, when the other players choose the report-contingent efficient effort
e∗(α′) is given by u1(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′), α∗) =
(15)Eε
[
y
(
α∗ + ε, σ
(
e1, e
∗
−1(α
′)
))( n∑
h=1
fh(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′))sh(y∗, α′)
)]
− c(e1).
The next result characterizes the sharing rule that induces truth telling by
the team leader and efficient effort exertion by all team members.
Proposition 2. Then the sharing rule s1(y∗, α′) =
1
y∗f 11
(
e∗ (α′) , e∗−i (α
′)
) n− 1
n
(
c′ (e∗ (α′))− y2 (α
∗ (y∗, α′) , ne∗ (α′))
n
)
+
1
n
(16 )
in which α∗ (y∗, α′) is the solution to y∗ = y (α∗, ne∗ (α′)) and s2(y∗, α′) =
. . . = sn(y∗, α′) = 1−s
1(y∗,α′)
n−1
implements the first best outcome.
Example 2: We continue with our example 1 by replacing the production
function with y(α∗, ε, e) = (α∗ + ε)
∑
i ei, in which ε is realized after the
effort stage. Due to the linear structure of this example the noise washes out
and the same sharing rule with winning share
(17)s1(y∗, α′) =
1
n
− 1
nr
+
nα′2
y∗r
and losing share sj 6=1(y∗, α′) = 1−s
1(y∗,α′)
n−1
implements full efficiency.⊳
This section illustrates that our main efficiency result in proposition 1
does not depend critically on the quality of information the leader has. On
the contrary, we show that any expectation-zero noise term can be accom-
modated by our efficient sharing rule (16) without affecting the intuition of
our positive result.
4.2 Information aggregation
In this section we assume that each of the n players obtains an individual
signal α∗i in the otherwise unchanged environment from section 3, so that
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output now takes the form y∗(α∗, e) = y (
∑
i α
∗
i , e1 + · · ·+ en). These signals
(α∗1, . . . , α
∗
n) are drawn from the commonly know distribution Z with support
[a, b]n. The main difference to the case discussed there is that now not only
player 1 but also each other player must have the appropriate incentives to
report their complementary signals truthfully.
We apply the revelation principle and restrict attention to direct mecha-
nisms in which the agents report their private information to the mechanism
and the mechanism provides all agents with effort recommendations. The
revelation principle implies that, in looking for an efficient mechanism, we
can focus on those sharing rules under which the agents find it optimal to
report their signals truthfully and to follow their recommendation.
For simplicity, we denote by A∗ = α∗1+ · · ·+α∗n the true productivity and
by A′i = α∗1 + · · ·+ α∗i−1 + α′i + α∗i+1 + · · ·+ α∗n the aggregated productivity
in the case where all agents but i report truthfully while agent i reports α′i.
The vector of ex post efficient efforts corresponding to (3) is now defined
as the set of efforts which maximize social welfare as chosen by a benevolent
planner (who knows A∗ = α∗1 + · · ·+ α∗n), i.e.,
(18)max
e
y (A∗, e1 + · · ·+ en)−
∑
i
c(ei).
Hence, symmetric ex post efficient efforts e∗(A∗) = e∗1(A∗) = · · · = e∗n(A∗)
are defined through
(19)y2(A∗, e∗(A∗)) = c′(e∗(A∗)).
To implement efficiency, the designer recommends player efforts e∗(A′), in
which A′ = ∑i α′. Below we show that under sharing rule (6), adjusted
for the present information structure, it is indeed in the players’ interest to
follow this recommendation and report their signals truthfully, α′i = α
∗
i .
At the second stage, we define player i’s expected utility from action pair
(α′i, ei) given equilibrium behavior e
∗(A′) of everyone else as
ui((α
′
i, ei), e
∗
−i(A′),A∗)
= EA∗
[
y
(A∗, σ (ei, e∗−i(A′)))
(
n∑
h=1
fh(ei, e
∗
−i(A′))sh(y∗,A′)
) ∣∣∣∣A′
]
− c(ei)
(20)
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where observed output is y∗ = y
(A∗, σ (ei, e∗−i(A′))). For a given report α′i
we obtain player i’s first-order condition with respect to efforts ei as
(21)
∂ui((α
′
i, ei), e
∗
−i(A′),A∗)
∂ei
= y2
(A∗, σ (ei, e∗−i(A′)))
(
n∑
h=1
fh(ei, e
∗
−i(A′))sh(y∗,A′)
)
+ y
(A∗, σ (ei, e∗−i(A′)))
(
n∑
h=1
fh1 (ei, e
∗
−i(A′))sh(y∗,A′)
)
+y
(A∗, σ (ei, e∗−i(A′))) y2 (A∗, σ (ei, e∗−i(A′)))
(
n∑
h=1
fh(ei, e
∗
−i(A′))sh1(y∗,A′)
)
− c′(ei)
which is the same as condition (35) derived for player 1 in the proof of propo-
sition 1, with the only difference that A∗ and A′ are now sums. Therefore,
exactly as in the previous case, even after misreporting, all agents will follow
the designer’s recommendation and choose efforts e∗(A′).
At the first stage, therefore, each player i reports α′i such as to maxi-
mize expected utility (20) which, in symmetric equilibrium, implies that she
chooses
(22)max
α′i
ui((α
′
i, e
∗
(A′i) ), e∗−i(A′i),A∗) =
y (A∗, ne∗ (A′i))
n
− c(e∗(A′i))
which, from (19) is maximized at the report α′i = α
∗
i implying that player
i reports truthfully. With this changed interpretation, the sharing rule (6)
derived in proposition 1, with α′ replaced by A′, implements ex post efficient
efforts as defined in (19) also in the setup with information aggregation. This
fact allows us to state the following result.
Proposition 3. The efficient outcome is implementable in the setup with
information aggregation, i.e., in the case in which all team members receive
individual signals α∗i on joint team productivity A∗.
Example 3: We continue our example by replacing the production function
with y(A∗, e) = A∗∑i ei, in which α∗i is player i’s private information about
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team productivity and the true team productivity is measured by A∗ =∑
i α
∗
i . We replace the first stage of the game with a stage in which each
player privately reports their private α′i to the designer who subsequently
sends the effort recommendation e∗(A′) = A′ =∑i α′ to the team members.
Compared to the sharing rule of the previous example (17), the similar rule
with winning share
(23)s1(y∗,A′) = 1
n
− 1
nr
+
nA′2
y∗r
and losing shares sj 6=1(y∗,A′) = 1−s1(y∗,A′)
n−1
implements the first best outcome.⊳
4.3 Leading by Example
In this section we change the structure of the interaction and allow for the
leader to choose her effort before the other players. This effort is assumed
to be observable by her team partners. We show that in such a case, there
exists a simpler ranking-based sharing rule which implements the efficient
outcome. This sharing rule will only depend on observed output.
Here, we consider the following sequential game: at the first stage, the
leader chooses effort e1. Then, at the second stage, all other players j 6= 1
observe e1 and choose their own efforts ej(e1(·)). Following this, a noisy
ranking of all players’ efforts realizes. The winner receives fraction s1 of final
team output and each of the losers receives share 1−s
1
n−1
.
In this environment, the sharing rule may be conditioned on the observed
output y∗ alone because the leader’s effort e1 is observed by all other players
before they choose their own efforts. Thus, the leader’s effort serves as a
signal of the team’s productivity parameter α∗. Moreover, and this is crucial,
this time structure limits the strategic possibilities of the leader. While
in the original game—in which everyone chooses efforts simultaneously—
the leader was able to deviate in both her report α′ and the chosen effort
(so multidimensional deviations had to be taken into account), one of these
channels is shut here. In the current structure, a misreport is more costly to
the leader, as she cannot report α′ and subsequently choose an effort which
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is inconsistent with this report.
Proposition 4. Assume the sequential game described above. The sharing
rule consisting of
(24 )s1(y∗) =
1
n
+
n− 1
n
c′(e∗ (α˘ (y∗)))− y2(α˘(y∗),ne∗(α˘(y∗)))
n
y∗f 11 (e
∗ (α˘ (y∗)) , e∗−i (α˘ (y
∗)))
and sj(y∗) = 1−s
1(y∗)
n−1
for all j 6= 1 in which α˘ (y∗) is the solution to y∗ =
y (α, ne1(α)), implements efficient efforts.
Example 4: We continue our example with y = α∗
∑
i ei, c(ei) =
1
2
e2i , and
f 1(ei, e−i) = e
r
i/
∑
erj by replacing the simultaneous game with the sequential
structure described above. In this sequential game, a tournament with shares
(25)s1 =
(n− 1) + r
nr
, sj =
r − 1
nr
for j 6= 1
implements efficiency. To see this, note that on observing the effort choice
of player 1, e1, players j 6= 1 believe that the productivity parameter of
the team is α∗ = e1. Given sharing rule (25), it is a best response for the
uninformed players to follow their leader by choosing exactly ej = e1. At the
first stage, anticipating that the uninformed players are going to follow suit
by choosing ej = e1, player 1’s best strategy is to choose effort e1 = α
∗, thus
communicating the true state of world and implementing efficiency.
Note that sharing rule (25) is independent of output. This is due to
the fact that this example uses linear production function. As shown in
proposition 4, however, this independence is not obtained in the general
production case.⊳
In a setup with linear production and quadratic effort costs, Hermalin
(1998, p1192) finds that leading by example is superior to a range of other
mechanisms. Nevertheless, leading by example fails to achieve full efficiency
because the usual moral hazard problem remains. The reason for this failure
is the fixed sharing rule Hermalin (1998) uses throughout the paper. We show
that a well-designed tournament, by orchestrating competition among the
players, removes the free-riding incentives while ensuring truthful information
revelation.
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Remark 3 explains that fixed shares can generally not provide incentives
for the efficient provision of efforts. This remains true with upfront exertion
of observable efforts by a privately informed leader.
We assumed so far that only final output is contractible. If the leader’s
upfront effort is contractible, however, then the next proposition states that
there exists a sharing rule that provides the correct incentives for all agents
which conditions only the leader’s observed effort, e1.
Proposition 5. Assume the sequential game described above. If the leader’s
effort e1 is contractible, then the sharing rule consisting of
(26 )s1 (e1) =
1
n
+
n− 1
n
c′ (e1)− y2(α∗∗(e1),ne1)n
y (α∗∗ (e1) , ne1) f 11 (e1, e1)
in which α∗∗ (e1) is the solution to e
∗ (α∗∗) = e1, together with equally split
losers’ prizes, implements efficient efforts.
4.4 Limited liability along the equilibrium path
For this section, we restrict attention to symmetric, ratio-based contest suc-
cess functions. We define a success function fˆ 1(xi) as ratio-based if it only
depends on the vector of ratios of a player’s effort over each of her opponents’
efforts xi =
(
ei
e1
, . . . , ei
ei−1
, ei
ei+1
, . . . , ei
en
)
.15 We take symmetry to imply that,
for any two players l 6= m and for any two vectors of efforts, (e1, . . . , en) and
(e˜1, . . . , e˜n) with ek = e˜k for k /∈ {l, m} and el = e˜m and em = e˜l, we have
(27)fˆ 1(xl) = fˆ
1(x˜m).
The Tullock success function is an example of such a symmetric, ratio-based
function. When agents exert identical equilibrium efforts e∗(α∗), then the
above implies that for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, l, m 6= i, we have that ∂fˆ1(1)
∂xil
=
∂fˆ1(1)
∂xim
where 1 is the n− 1 dimensional vector with 1 at every position. The
15 In order to avoid technical complications with unbounded ratios, we require efforts to be
positive for the purposes of this limited liability discussion. In other words ei ∈ [δ,∞)
in which δ > 0 can be arbitrarily close to zero.
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relationship between the ratio-based success function and the original effort-
based success function is such that
(28)fˆ 1
(
ei
e1
,
ei
e2
, . . . ,
ei
ei−1
,
ei
ei+1
, . . . ,
ei
en
)
= f 1 (ei, e−i)
with derivative
(29)
d
dei
fˆ 1
(
ei
e1
,
ei
e2
, . . . ,
ei
ei−1
,
ei
ei+1
, . . . ,
ei
en
)
=
∑
j 6=i
1
ej
∂
∂xij
fˆ 1 (xi1, . . . , xii−1, xii+1, . . . , xin)
= f 11 (ei, e−i) .
In symmetric equilibrium we therefore have
(30)
d
dei
fˆ 1 (1) =
∑
j 6=i
1
e∗ (α′)
∂
∂xij
fˆ 1 (1) = f 11
(
e∗ (α′) , e∗−i (α
′)
)
.
In our base model, efficient efforts are defined by y2(α
∗, ne(α∗)) = c′(e∗(α∗)).
Substituting the latter with the prior in sharing rule (6) gives us
(31)s1(y∗, α∗) =
1
n
+
(n− 1) y2(α∗(y∗, α∗), ne∗(α∗))
ny(α∗, ne∗(α∗))f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))
[
n− 1
n
]
>
1
n
implying that the equilibrium winner’s share is always greater than a loser’s
share.
Winning share (31) satisfies limited liability along the equilibrium path
if, in addition to the inequality already shown in (31), s1(y∗, α∗) ≤ 1. This
is the case if
(32)f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗)) ≥ n− 1
n
y2(α
∗(y∗, α∗), ne∗(α∗))
y(α∗, ne∗)
.
The last inequality implies that
(33)f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗)) ≥ 1
e∗
n− 1
n2
ne∗y2(α
∗(y∗, α∗), ne∗(α∗))
y(α∗, ne∗)
in which the last fraction on the right-hand side is smaller than 1 because
of concavity of y. Thus, (30) together with concavity of production implies
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that, for any symmetric, ratio-based success function, we obtain as sufficient
condition for limited liability to be satisfied that
(34)fˆ 11 (1) ≥
1
n2
.
Losers receive positive shares in equilibrium if the ranking technology is suf-
ficiently accurate. This argument cannot demonstrate, however, that the
satisfaction of limited liability is also possible outside of equilibrium.
5 Concluding remarks
In addition to the motivation offered in the introduction, our model can
be interpreted as providing a solution to the coordination problem. This
problem refers to situations in which the interests of the individuals involved
coincide. It would be therefore jointly optimal if they would individually
all select this jointly most beneficial option. Nevertheless, in many such
situations, it is not in the individual’s self-interest to choose the action which
implements the greater good.
Leadership is but one means by which social groups attempt to solve
the coordination problem and can take many forms in general public life.16
The present paper analyzes the question of what constitutes the coordinative
essence of leadership in team structures where (some of) the team members
are privately informed about some aspect of the profitability of a joint project.
Such proprietary information arises naturally if, for example, some team
member occupies a role in a predefined organizational structure by virtue of
which she acquires and disseminates information.
An effective coordinating scheme then needs to implement i) the com-
munication of private information and ii) the efficient effort provision by all
team members although these efforts may not be directly observed. In the
environment we consider, this gives rise to the nested and triple problem
16 The information-based foundation that we offer for leadership is, of course, not the
only possible explanation. Alternatives include delegation, sharing of responsibility,
inclusion of stakeholders and others.
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of adverse selection because of the leader’s private information, moral haz-
ard because individual efforts are unobservable, and balanced budget because
of the team structure which renders the classic principal-agent and budget
breaker solutions inapplicable.
Examples which emphasize the coordination aspect and feature the prop-
erties outlined above can be found in military history. During the First World
War, for instance, officers in most armies used a ‘trench whistle’ to communi-
cate isolated timing information to a team. Its high pitched sound was used
to coordinate large scale attacks. At the officers’ blow of their whistles, the
soldiers would go ‘over the top’ of the trenches and attack the enemy. Note
that signalling the attack at the wrong time may result in this story in over
or under exertion of team member efforts relative to the efficient level which
may benefit or harm the standing of the whistling leader.
A final example of carefully designed incentive structures in partnerships
is the 19th century American whaling industry beautifully described in Hilt
(2006). The author describes how managing partners provided appropriate
incentives to the whaler’s captains and crews on their entirely unobserv-
able multi-year expeditions. During the 1830s, part of the industry changed
its structure from the previously unincorporated partnerships to corporative
ownership. “This represented a significant departure from the traditional
reliance on concentrated ownership to resolve incentive conflicts in the in-
dustry, and it failed: none of the whaling corporations survived beyond the
1840s, and few experienced much financial success, at a time the American
whaling industry as a whole continued to expand.” (Hilt, 2006, p198)
Appendix A: Omitted proofs
Proof of proposition 1. For a given report α′, given that every other player
chooses e∗(α′), the team-leader’s first-order condition with respect to effort
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choice is
∂u1(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′), α∗)
∂e1
= y2(α
∗, σ(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′)))
(
n∑
l=1
f l(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′))sl(y∗, α′)
)
+ y(α∗, σ(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′)))
(
n∑
l=1
f l1(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′))sl(y∗, α′)
)
+ y(α∗, σ(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′)))y2(α
∗, σ(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′)))
(
n∑
l=1
f l(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′))sl1(y
∗, α′)
)
− c′(e1)
(35)
which equals
y2(α
∗, σ(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′)))
(
n∑
l=1
f l(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′))sl(y∗, α′)
)
− c′(e1)
+ y(α∗, σ(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′)))
(
n−1∑
l=1
f l1(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′))
(
sl(y∗, α′)− sn(y∗, α′))
)
+ y(α∗, σ(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′)))y2(α
∗, σ(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′)))
(
n∑
l=1
f l(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′))sl1(y
∗, α′)
)
(36)
where f l1(e1, e−1) =
∂
∂e1
f l(e1, e−1). The equality holds because of (1), bal-
anced budget, and
∑
l f
l
1(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′)) =
∑
l s
l
1(y
∗, α′) = 0. In case of equal
effort levels of all the agents, e1 = e
∗(α′), f l(e1 = e
∗(α′), e−1 = e
∗(α′)) = 1/n
for all l = 1, . . . , n. Then, setting the first-order condition with respect to
effort choice zero gives
(37)
0 =
∂u1(e
∗(α′), e∗−1(α
′), α∗)
∂e1
=
y2(α
∗, ne∗(α′))
n
+ y∗
(
n−1∑
l=1
f l1(e
∗(α′), e∗−1(α
′))
(
sl(y∗, α′)− sn(y∗, α′))
)
− c′(e∗(α′))
with output in equilibrium y∗ = y(α∗, ne∗(α′)). Therefore, we get that
(38)
n−1∑
l =1
f l1(e
∗(α′), e∗−1(α
′))
(
sl(y∗, α′)− sn(y∗, α′))
=
c′(e∗(α′))− y2(α∗, ne∗(α′))/n
y∗
.
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Under the simple prize structure s1(y∗, α′) ≥ s2(y∗, α′) = · · · = sn(y∗, α′)
(which implies that sn(y∗, α′) = 1−s
1(y∗,α′)
n−1
), this equals
f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−1(α
′))
(
s1(y∗, α′)− sn(y∗, α′)) = c′(e∗(α′))− y2(α∗, ne∗(α′))/n
y∗
⇐⇒
(39)
s1(y∗, α′) =
1
n
+
n− 1
ny∗
[
c′(e∗(α′))
f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−1(α
′))
− y2(α
∗(y∗, α′), ne∗(α′)))
f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−1(α
′))n
]
where α∗(y∗, α′) is the solution to
(40)y∗ = y(α∗, ne∗(α′)))
Note that a similar argument implies that also all the uninformed agents
for any report of the team leader α′ prefer to exert the report-contingent
efficient effort level e∗(α′). Therefore, we only have to show that, at the first
stage, the team leader prefers to announce the true signal. At the reporting
stage, a player 1 who exerts efforts e∗(α′) reports α′ such as to maximize
expected utility (5) which implies that she chooses
(41)max
α′
u1(e
∗(α′), e∗−1(α
′), α∗) =
y (α∗, ne∗(α′))
n
− c(e∗(α′))
which, from (3) is maximized at the report α′ = α∗ implying that player 1
reports truthfully. All team members will find it optimal to accept the con-
tract because each player will get 1/n of the generated efficient social surplus
which must be positive because y2(α
∗, 0) > 0 and c′(0) = 0. Therefore, the
players’ ex post efficient efforts e∗(α∗) are implementable.
Proof of corollary 1. Recall that the winner’s share is
(42)s1(y∗, α′) =
1
n
+
n− 1
ny∗
[
c′(e∗(α′))
f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−i(α
′))
− y2(α
∗(y∗, α′), ne∗(α′))
f 11 (e
∗(α′), e∗−i(α
′))n
]
.
Given the truth telling behavior of the team leader, we can rewrite the equi-
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librium winner’s share as follows
s1(y∗, α∗) =
1
n
+
n− 1
n
[
c′(e∗(α∗))
f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))y∗
− y2(α
∗(y∗, α∗), ne∗(α∗))
f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))y∗n
]
=
1
n
+
n− 1
n
[
c′(e∗(α∗))
f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))y∗
− y2(α
∗, ne∗(α∗))
f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))y∗n
]
=
1
n
+
n− 1
n
[
y2(α
∗, ne∗(α∗))
f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))y∗
− y2(α
∗, ne∗(α∗))
f 11 (e
∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗))y∗n
]
=
1
n
+
(
n− 1
n
)2
1
f 11
(
e∗(α∗), e∗−i(α
∗)
) y2(α∗, ne∗(α∗))
y(α∗, ne∗(α∗))
(43)
where the second line follows since α∗ = α∗(y∗, α∗) and the third line follows
since in the efficient allocation we have c′(e∗(α∗)) = y2(α
∗, ne∗(α∗)).
Proof of proposition 2. The derivative of the team leader’s expected util-
ity with respect to her effort is given by∫ ε¯
ε
[
y2
(
α∗
+ ε; σ
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
)){
f 1
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
)
s1
(
y
(
α∗ + ε; σ
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
))
, α′
)
+
(
1− f 1 (e1, e∗−1 (α′))) 1− s1
(
y
(
α∗ + ε; σ
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
))
, α′
)
n− 1
}
+ y
(
α∗
+ ε; σ
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
))
f 11
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
) {s1 (y (α∗ + ε; σ (e1, e∗−1 (α′))) , α′)
− 1− s
1
(
y
(
α∗ + ε; σ
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
))
, α′
)
n− 1 }
+ y
(
α∗ + ε; σ
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
))
y2
(
α∗ + ε; σ
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
))
××s11
(
y
(
α∗ + ε; σ
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
))
, α′
){
f 1
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
)
− 1− f
1
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
)
n− 1
}]
g (ε) dε− c′(e1).
(44)
We will show that for the stated sharing rule, the first order condition is
satisfied. Recall that f 1
(
e∗ (α′) , e∗−1 (α
′)
)
= 1/n. Therefore, the first-order
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condition boils down to
(45)
∫ ε¯
ε
[
y2 (α
∗ + ε;ne∗ (α′))
n
+ y (α∗ + ε;ne∗ (α′)) f 11
(
e1, e
∗
−1 (α
′)
)×
×
(
n
s1 (y (α∗ + ε;ne∗ (α′)) , α′)
n− 1 −
1
n− 1
)]
g (ε) dε
− c′(e∗ (α′)) = 0.
Inserting the rule from (16) completes the proof. We still have to show that
it is optimal for the leader to report truthfully her signal. For the leader,
(46)max
α′
u1(e1, e
∗(α′), α∗) = max
α′
Ey (α∗ + ε, ne∗ (α′))
n
−c (e∗ (α′))
is solved at α′ = α∗ by efficiency condition (13).
Proof of proposition 4. We show that this sharing rule i) induces the
leader to choose e1 = e
∗ (α∗), and ii) all the other agents to follow the leader
and to choose also e1. We start with analyzing the incentives of agent j 6= 1,
given that all the other agents follow the described strategy. The expected
utility of agent j 6= 1 if he chooses effort e is given by
(47)
y (α∗, e+ (n− 1)e∗ (α∗))
[
f 1 (e, e−j
∗ (α∗)) s1 (y)
+
(
1− f 1 (e, e−j∗ (α∗))
) 1− s1 (y)
n− 1
]
− c(e).
The derivative of the last expression with respect to e is given by
(48)
y2 (α
∗, e+ (n− 1)e∗ (α∗))
[
f 1 (e, e−j
∗ (α∗)) s1 (y)
+
(
1− f 1 (e, e−j∗ (α∗))
) 1− s1 (y)
n− 1
]
− c′(e)
+ y (α∗, e+(n− 1)e∗ (α∗))
[
f 11 (e, e−j
∗ (α∗))
(
ns1 (y)
n− 1 −
1
n− 1
)
+ s1
′
(y)
(
f 1 (e, e−j
∗ (α∗))
− (1− f
1 (e, e−j
∗ (α∗)))
n− 1
)
y2 (α
∗, e+ (n− 1)e∗ (α∗))
]
.
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For e = e1 to be an equilibrium, it must be that the last derivative at point
e = e1 is 0. Since f
1 (e∗ (α∗) , e−j
∗ (α∗)) = 1/n the previous expression can
be rewritten as
(49)
c′(e∗(α∗))− y2(α
∗, ne∗(α∗))
n
= y(α∗, ne∗(α∗))
[
f 11 (e
∗ (α∗) , e−j
∗ (α∗))
(
ns1(y)
n− 1 −
1
n− 1
)]
Inserting
(50)s1 (y) =
1
n
+
n− 1
n
c′(e∗ (α˘ (y∗)))− y2(α˘(y∗),ne∗(α˘(y∗)))
n
y∗f 11 (e
∗ (α˘ (y∗)) , e−j∗ (α˘ (y∗)))
and noticing that in the equilibrium α˘ (y∗) = α∗ gives the required condition.
For the leader, her expected utility if she chooses effort e1 when the state
of the world is α∗ is given by
(51)y (α∗, ne1)
1
n
− c(e1).
This is maximized at
(52)c′ (e1) = y2 (α
∗, ne1)
which is the efficient effort level, given the state of the world α∗.
Proof of proposition 5. We show that this sharing rule i) induces the
leader to choose e1 = e
∗ (α∗), and ii) all the other agents to follow the leader
and to choose also e1. We start with analyzing the incentives of agent j 6= 1,
given that all the other agents follow the described strategy. The expected
utility of agent j 6= 1 if he chooses effort e is given by
(53)
y (α∗, e+ (n− 1)e∗ (α∗))
[
f 1 (e, e−j
∗ (α∗)) s1
+
(
1− f 1 (e, e−j∗ (α∗))
) 1− s1
n− 1
]
− c(e).
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Since s1 is independent of the realized output, agent j cannot affect it. The
derivative of the last expression with respect to e is given by
(54)
y2 (α
∗, e+ (n− 1)e∗ (α∗))
[
f 1 (e, e−j
∗ (α∗)) s1
+
(
1− f 1 (e, e−j∗ (α∗))
) 1− s1
n− 1
]
+ y (α∗, e+ (n− 1)e∗ (α∗))
[
f 11 (e, e−j
∗ (α∗))
(
ns1
n− 1 −
1
n− 1
)]
− c′(e).
For e = e1 to be an equilibrium, it must be that the derivative is 0 at this
point. Since f 1 (e∗ (α∗) , e−j
∗ (α∗)) = 1/n and c′(e∗ (α∗)) = y2(α
∗, ne(α∗)),
the previous expression can be rewritten as
(55)
c′ (e∗ (α∗))− y2 (α
∗, ne∗ (α∗))
n
= y (α∗, ne∗ (α∗))
[
f 11 (e
∗ (α∗) , e−j
∗ (α∗))
(
ns1
n− 1 −
1
n− 1
)]
which implies
(56)s1 (e1) =
1
n
+
n− 1
n
c′ (e1)− y2(α∗,ne1)n
y (α∗∗, ne1) f 11 (e1, e1)
.
Inserting
(57)s1 (e1) =
1
n
+
n− 1
n
c′ (e1)− y2(α∗∗(e1),ne1)n
y (α∗∗ (e1) , ne1) f 11 (e1, e1)
and noticing that in the equilibrium α∗∗ (e1) = α
∗ gives the required condi-
tion.
For the leader, her expected utility if she chooses effort e1 when the state
of the world is α∗ is given by
(58)y (α∗, ne1)
1
n
− c(e1)
which is maximized at
(59)c′ (e1) = y2 (α
∗, ne1)
which is the efficient effort level, given the state of the world α∗.
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Appendix B: Equilibrium existence
We now examine in which cases the efficient efforts implemented through
sharing rule (6) constitute an equilibrium. Since equilibrium existence de-
pends on the detailed specification of the curvature of the ranking technology,
the production function and costs, we switch into a particular class in which
we demonstrate that the exertion of efficient efforts constitutes a global util-
ity maximum under our proposed sharing rule (6).
This is not the only case in which equilibria exist in our model. In order
to illustrate this, we add an example of a commonly used model setup in
which our candidate equilibrium exists. This example falls outside the class
investigated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. We restrict attention to the class of problems consisting of
output y(α∗, e1+(n−1)e∗(α′)) = α∗w¯(e1+(n−1)e∗(α′)), cost c(e1) = (ex1)/x,
for x > 1, w¯ > 0 and generalized Tullock contest success technology with
precision parameter r. Moreover, we restrict permissible α to the compact
range [a, na] for a > 0. A sufficient condition for efficient effort provision
by every player and truthful type reporting by player 1 to be an equilibrium
in this class is that x = r.
Proof of proposition 6. We start with the second stage effort choice prob-
lem given any report α′. Consider the objective
(60)
u1
(
e1, e
∗
−1(α
′), α∗
)
= y(α∗, e1)
(
(1− f 1(e1))(1− s1(e1))
n− 1 + f
1(e1)s
1(e1)
)
− c(e1)
where
(61)s1(e1) =
(n− 1)
(
c′∗(α′))
f1
1
(e∗(α′))
− y2(α˜(e1),e∗(α′))
nf1
1
(e∗(α′))
)
ny(α∗, e1)
+
1
n
.
We use shorthand notation y(α∗, eˆ) = y(α∗, eˆ + (n − 1)e∗(α′)), f 1(eˆ) =
f 1(eˆ, e−i
∗(α′)) with eˆ ∈ {e1, e∗(α′)} and similarly for all other expressions.
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Then
∂u1
∂e1
=
(62)y(α∗, e1)
[(1− f 1(e1))( (n−1)y2(α∗,e1)µny(α∗,e1)2 + (n−1)α˜′(e1)y1,2(α˜(e1),e∗(α′))n2f11 (e∗(α′))y(α∗ ,e1)
)
n− 1
+ f 1(e1)
(
−(n− 1)y2(α
∗, e1)µ
ny(α∗, e1)2
− (n− 1)α˜
′(e1)y1,2(α˜(e1), e
∗(α′))
n2f 11 (e
∗(α′))y(α∗, e1)
)
+ f 11 (e1)
(
(n− 1)µ
ny(α∗, e1)
+
1
n
)
−
f 11 (e1)
(
− (n−1)µ
ny(α∗,e1)
− 1
n
+ 1
)
n− 1
]
+y2(α
∗, e1)

f
1(e1)
(
(n− 1)µ
ny(α∗, e1)
+
1
n
)
+
(1− f 1(e1))
(
− (n−1)µ
ny(α∗,e1)
− 1
n
+ 1
)
n− 1


− c′(e1)
in which µ =
c′∗(α′)
f 11 (e
∗(α′))
− y2(α˜(e1), e
∗(α′))
nf 11 (e
∗(α′))
. (62) simplifies to
∂u1
∂e1
=
y2(α
∗, e1)
n
− c′(e1) + f
1
1 (e1)
f 11 (e
∗(α′))
(
c′∗(α′))− y2(α˜(e1), e
∗(α′))
n
)
− α˜′(e1)y1,2(α˜(e1), e
∗(α′))
n2f 11 (e
∗(α′))
{
nf 1(e1)− 1
}
.
(63)
Inserting
(64)α˜′(e1) =
y2(α
∗, e1)
y1(α˜(e1), e∗(α′))
we obtain
∂u1
∂e1
=
y2(α
∗, e1)
n
− c′(e1) + f
1
1 (e1)
f 11 (e
∗(α′))
(
c′∗(α′))− y2(α˜(e1), e
∗(α′))
n
)
− y2(α
∗, e1)
y1(α˜(e1), e∗(α′))
y1,2(α˜(e1), e
∗(α′))
n2f 11 (e
∗(α′))
{
nf 1(e1)− 1
}
.
(65)
For the linear case y(α∗, eˆ) = α∗w(eˆ + (n − 1)e∗(α′)) = α∗w(eˆ) using again
the shortened notation for the function w(·) in the last step we get
(66)
∂u1
∂e1
=
α∗w′(e1)
n
− c′(e1) + f
1
1 (e1)
f 11 (e
∗(α′))
(
c′∗(α′))− α
∗w(e1)w
′∗(α′))
nw(e∗(α′))
)
− α
∗w′(e1)
w(e∗(α′)
w′∗(α′))
n2f 11 (e
∗(α′))
{
nf 1(e1)− 1
}
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in which we substituted the linear adjustment
(67)α˜′(e1) =
α∗w′(e1)
w(e∗(α′))
.
Using linear w(eˆ) = w¯(eˆ+(n−1)e∗(α′)) and monomial cost c(eˆ) = eˆx/x, the
foc equals
(68)
∂u1
∂e1
=
α∗w¯
n
−ex−11 +
f 11 (e1)
f 11 (e
∗(α′))
(
e∗(α′)x−1− α
∗w¯(e1 + e
∗(α′)(n− 1))
n2e∗(α′)
)
− α
∗
ne∗(α′)
w¯
n2f 11 (e
∗(α′))
{
nf 1(e1)− 1
}
.
We use ke∗(α′) in order to allow for any possible effort deviation. Then
substituting e1 = ke
∗(α′), the report-contingent efficient e∗(α′) = (w¯α′)
1
x−1
and Tullock technology into the ratio of success function slopes gives
(69)
f 11 (e1)
f 11 (e
∗(α′))
=
(
(n− 1)rer−11 e∗(α′)r
(er1 + (n− 1)e∗(α′)r)2
)
/
(
(n− 1)r
e∗(α′)n2
)
=
e∗(α′)n2(e1e
∗(α′))r
e1 (er1 + (n− 1)e∗(α′)r)2
=
n2
(
k(α′w¯)
2
x−1
)r
k
((
k(α′w¯)
1
x−1
)r
+ (n− 1)
(
(α′w¯)
1
x−1
)r)2
=
n2kr−1
(kr + n− 1)2 .
Making the same substitutions in the remainder of (68) step by step gives,
for e1 = ke
∗(α′)
(70)
∂u1
∂e1
=
α∗w¯
n
− (e∗(α′)k)x−1
+
f 11 (ke
∗(α′))
f 11 (e
∗(α′))
(
e∗(α′)x−1 − α
∗w¯(e∗(α′)k + e∗(α′)(n− 1))
e∗(α′)n2
)
− α
∗w¯(nf 1(e∗(α′)k)− 1)
e∗(α′)n3f 11 (e
∗(α′))
,
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inserting Tullock technology gives
(71)
∂u1
∂e1
=
α∗w¯
n
− (e∗(α′)k)x−1
+
f 11 (ke
∗(α′))
f 11 (e
∗(α′))
(
e∗(α′)x−1 − α
∗w¯(e∗(α′)k + e∗(α′)(n− 1))
e∗(α′)n2
)
−
α∗w¯
(
n
(n−1)e∗(α′)r(e∗(α′)k)−r+1
− 1
)
(n− 1)nr ,
and finally inserting e∗(α′) = (w¯α′)
1
x−1 gives
(72)
∂u1
∂e1
=
α∗w¯
n
−
(
k(α′w¯)
1
x−1
)x−1
+
n2kr−1
(kr + n− 1)2

((α′w¯) 1x−1)x−1
−
α∗w¯(α′w¯)−
1
x−1
(
k(α′w¯)
1
x−1 + (n− 1)(α′w¯) 1x−1
)
n2


−
α∗w¯

 n
(n−1)
(
(α′w¯)
1
x−1
)r(
k(α′w¯)
1
x−1
)
−r
+1
− 1


(n− 1)nr
which simplifies into
∂u1
∂e1
= w¯
(
α∗
n
− α′kx−1 − α
∗ (kr − 1)
nr (kr + n− 1) +
kr−1 (α′n2 − α∗(k + n− 1))
(kr + n− 1)2
)
.
(73)
As a special case, we substitute x = r and get
(74)
∂u1
∂e1
=
n
α∗
kr−1
(
α′n2 − α∗(k + n− 1)
(kr + n− 1)2 − α
′
)
+ 1− k
r − 1
r (kr + n− 1) .
We need to find a condition which ensures that this is positive for k < 1 and
negative for k > 1.
1. k < 1: We need to ensure that
(75)
n
α∗
kr−1
(
α′n2 − α∗(k + n− 1)
(kr + n− 1)2 −α
′
)
+1>
kr − 1
r (kr + n− 1)
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the right-hand side of which is negative whenever k < 1. In order for
the left-hand side to be positive, we need
(76)
α∗k1−r
n
+
α′n2 − α∗(k + n− 1)
(kr + n− 1)2 > α
′
which is implied by
(77)α′
(
n2
(kr + n− 1)2 − 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A
+α∗
(
k1−r
n
− 1
kr + n− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B
> 0.
A > 0 for all k < 1 and r > 0 and B > 0 if k < 1 and
(78)r >
log
(
k(n−1)
n−k
)
log(k)
≥ n
n− 1
where the final right-hand side term is the limit of the increasing log-
ratio as k → 1.
We showed that for x = r, it is true that
α∗
n
− α′kx−1 − α
∗ (kr − 1)
nr (kr + n− 1) +
kr−1 (α′n2 − α∗(k + n− 1))
(kr + n− 1)2 > 0.
(79)
However, since the derivative of the left-hand side of the last inequality
with respect to x is −α′kx−1 ln k which is positive for any k < 1, the
last inequality holds for any x ≥ r.
2. k > 1: We start from (73) and want to show that
kr−1 (α′n2 − α∗(k + n− 1))
(kr + n− 1)2 − α
′kx−1 <
α∗ (kr − 1)
nr (kr + n− 1) −
α∗
n
implied by
(80)
n
α∗k
(
kr (α′n2 − α∗(k + n− 1))
(kr + n− 1)2 −α
′kx
)
+1<
1
nr
kr−1
+ r
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the right-hand side of which is positive. Thus, we need to show that
(81)
n
α∗k
(
kr (α′n2 − α∗(k + n− 1))
(kr + n− 1)2 − α
′kx
)
+ 1 < 0
or, equivalently, that
(82)
α∗k1−r
α′n
+
α′n2 − α∗(k + n− 1)
α′ (kr + n− 1)2 < k
x−r
which is implied by
(83)
n2
(kr + n− 1)2 −
α∗(k + n− 1)
α′ (kr + n− 1)2 <
k−r (α′nkx − α∗k)
α′n
which gives
(84)
α∗k − α′nkx
nkr
<
α∗(k + n− 1)− α′n2
(kr + n− 1)2 .
We restrict possible α ∈ [a, b = sa], with s > n, and—since (84) is
linear in α on both sides—obtain two subcases:
(a) Highest misreport α∗ = a, α′ = b: resulting in
(85)
ak−r (k − snkx)
n
<
a (k − sn2 + n− 1)
(kr + n− 1)2
which holds for x sufficiently higher than r. For instance, for
x = r, we obtain
(86)
k
kr
− 1 < sn− 1 + n(k − 1 + n− sn
2)
(kr − 1 + n)2
in which the left-hand side is negative and the right-hand side is
positive for k > 1 because
sn (kr + n− 1)2 + n (k − 1 + n− sn2)− (kr − 1 + n)2
(kr − 1 + n)2 > 0⇐⇒
ns (kr + n− 1)2 − (kr + n− 1)2 + n (k + n2(−s) + n− 1) > 0
(87)
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which equals
(88)(ns− 1) (kr + n− 1)2 > n3s− n(k+ n− 1).
Recall that the left-hand side equals the right-hand side at k =
1 by construction. The left-hand side derivative is 2rkr−1(ns −
1) (kr + n− 1) > 0 and the rhs derivative is −n < 0. Hence, for
k > 1, (86) holds.
(b) Lowest misreport α∗ = b, α′ = a: resulting in
(89)
ak−r (sk − nkx)
n
<
a(k − 1 + n)s− an2
(kr + n− 1)2
which also holds for x sufficiently higher than r. For instance, for
x = r, we obtain
(90)
k
kr
− 1 < n
s
− n (n
2 − s(k + n− 1))
s (kr + n− 1)2 − 1
in which the left-hand side is negative for k > 1 and the right-hand
side is positive if
(91)
n
s
− 1 > n (n
2 − s(k + n− 1))
s (kr + n− 1)2 .
We can rewrite the last inequality as follows
(92)
n− s
s
>
n (n2 − s(k + n− 1))
s (kr + n− 1)2 ⇐⇒
(n− s) (kr + n− 1)2 > n3 − sn(k + n− 1).
We have equality for k = 1. The derivative of the right-hand side
of the last inequality is −sn which is negative for s > 0, while
the derivative of the left-hand side is (n− s) (kr + n− 1) 2rkr−1
which is positive for n > s. Hence, for k > 1, (90) holds.
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Given player 1’s choice of e1 = e
∗(α′) at the second stage,17 we now move
on to the reporting stage where she chooses α′ in order to maximize utility
(93)
max
α′
y(α∗, ne(α′))
(∑n
l=1 f
l(e∗(α′))sl(y∗, α′)
)− c(e(α′))
= max
α′
u1(e
∗(α′), α∗) = y(α∗, ne(α′)) 1
n
− c(e(α′))
because f l(e∗(α′)) = 1/n for every l and
∑
l s
l(y∗, α′) = 1. This yields the
first-order condition
(94)y2(α
∗, ne(α′)) = c′(e(α′))
which equals the social planner’s efficiency condition. Therefore, if the so-
lution to the planner’s problem is unique, then player 1 shares the same
objective and will choose to truthfully report α′ = α∗.
The following example shows that it is easy to find instances violating
the sufficient conditions of proposition 6 while still exhibiting the equilibrium
identified in proposition 1.
Example 5: Consider the following two-players example outside of the class
for which we show existence in proposition 6: (i) square-root team production
y(α∗, e1, e2) = α
∗w¯
√
e1 + e2 and (ii) ‘exponential difference’ contest success
function defined for two players as
(95)f 1(e1, e2) =
1
1 + exp (r(e2 − e1)) , for r > 0.
All other specifications are as in proposition 6. Assume that player two be-
haves according to our equilibrium prescription, i.e., e2 = e
∗(α′) = 8
1
1−2x (α′w¯)
2
2x−1
(from the solution to the planner’s problem). In this example setup, we ob-
tain player one’s objective as u1(e1, e
∗
−1(α
′), α∗) =
(96)
α∗w¯(e1 + e
∗(α′)) (s1(y∗, α′) (exp(r(e1 − e∗(α′)))− 1) + 1)
exp(r(e1 − e∗(α′))) + 1
in which the equivalent of the sharing rule (6) is
(97)s1(y∗, α′) =
1
2
(
1− α
∗w¯e1 + α
∗w¯e∗(α′)− 4e∗(α′)x
α∗w¯e1e∗(α′)r + α∗w¯e∗(α′)2r
)
.
17 Since the effort choice problem of the uninformed players is identical to that of the
leader, this argument directly implies that also ej = e
∗(α′) for every j > 1.
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Consider parameter values x = 2, r = 2.5, α ∈ [1, 50]. A plot of player
one’s objective against e∗(α′) by player two in figure 1 shows no profitable
deviations.
2 4 6 8
10
15
20
25
e1
e
∗(α′)
u1(α
∗
, α
′
, e1, e2 = e
∗(α′))
Figure 1: Possible deviations from e∗(α′) for α ∈ [1, 50]; the objective possess no
other maxima.
Hence, this example illustrates that situations can be found which exhibit
the equilibrium behavior derived in proposition 1 and lie outside of the class
defined by the sufficient conditions presented in proposition 6.⊳
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